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_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
Opinion polling occupies a significant role within the political process of most liberal-capitalist societies, where 
it is used by governments, parties and the mass media alike.  This paper examines the extent to which polls are 
used for the same purposes in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular, 
for bringing political elites and citizens together.  It argues that these political elites are more concerned with 
using opinion polls for gaining competitive advantage over their rivals and for reaffirming their political power, 
than for devolving political power to citizens and improving the general processes of democratization. 
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_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The intervention that opinion polls have made into the political process within liberal-capitalist 
societies is pervasive, often problematic, and well documented.1  Yet, whilst political opinion polling 
occupies a well-entrenched position within many such countries, the same cannot be said for the 
newly emerging post-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe.  Prior to the collapse of 
communist regimes throughout the region, polling was limited in terms of its activities, the scope of 
issue coverage, and its ability to measure public opinion effectively.2  This article focuses primarily 
on the use made of opinion polls in post-communist societies by a range of political agents, including 
governments, political parties, and mass media organizations, in order to provide an account of the 
role of polls within the general processes of transition currently underway in these newly 
democratizing countries.  It is based almost entirely upon semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
both opinion polling companies, and with users of the polls.3  The interviews were designed to help 
identify the rationale for opinion poll usage by these political agencies, how the information was built 
into policy and programmes, and the degree of importance attached to polls in general activities.  It 
became clear during the course of the interviews that whilst opinion polls provided the opportunity 
for these political actors to articulate the views, needs and aspirations of the citizenry on political 
matters, ultimately polls were utilized not to establish some form of participatory ‘direct democracy’, 
but instead primarily to help political elites gain competitive advantage over their rivals and maximize 
their political power. 
 
Polls and The Political Process 
Schumpeter4 counterposes two extremes of representative democracy which can be used to 
articulate the relationship between opinion polls and the processes of democratization in capitalist 
societies, and to understand the use made of polls by governments, political parties and the mass 
media organizations in post-communist societies.  First, he conceptualizes a ‘classical doctrine of 
democracy’ characterized as ‘...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of 
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will’.5  This model broadly reflects 
Gallup’s hopes for polls as tools through which citizens could gain direct access to (and ultimately 
influence over) policy-makers and other political elites.6  Gallup’s preference was for political 
systems which were built upon the principles of direct democracy, where the opinions and priorities 
of the electorate determined policy agendas, and where elected politicians were responsive and 
accountable to the citizenry at all times during the electoral cycle.  In the absence of such political 
arrangements, he advocated the use of opinion polls in decision-making processes which could 
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formulate and express the views of the mass electorate, and serve as a channel of communication 
between the governed and the government.  He acknowledged that in representative democracies it 
is elites which wield political power, but claimed polls were a key element of popular input which 
elected representatives would have to take into account in decision-making; essentially he maintained 
that polls could help to redress the imbalance of power in society in favour of voters.  In this scenario, 
polls could serve three vital functions: firstly as  mechanisms to articulate the general will of the 
people; secondly to help facilitate the decentralization of political power from elites to mass civil 
society; and thirdly to combat the influence of dominant groups in society.  Such arguments form the 
basis of a populist model of opinion polling and political democratization.  
 An alternative view of the relationship between opinion polls and policy-making in capitalist 
societies can be understood through Schumpeter’s opposing extreme of competitive elitism.  This 
defines democracy as “...an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which the 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.7 
He claims that citizens are an ignorant and apathetic mass, which will inevitably be manipulated.  The 
remoteness of the world of international and national affairs from the lives of most people leaves them 
in a very weak position to make sound judgments about competing ideologies and policies.  
Moreover, the general susceptibility of individuals, and their vulnerability to the pressures of interest 
groups and the mass media, undercuts any independent basis for political thought.  In addition, the 
increasing use by politicians of the techniques of advertisers, erodes further any notion that the 
‘sovereign people’ are, or could be, the source of, and check on the powers of the ‘sovereign state’.8  
Furthermore, Schumpeter claimed that the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ was ambiguous.  He had 
a low estimation of the political, intellectual and objective capacities of the average citizen, and argued 
that the electorate should only have minimal political involvement, sufficient to legitimate the right 
of competing political elites to rule.  There should be a clear division of labour between voters and 
elected representatives, and the former should avoid trying to instruct or influence representatives, to 
allow leaders to define the parameters of public policy efficiently and unimpeded. 
 The implications for polls which this model of competitive elitism holds is that rather than 
reacting to voter’s concerns through opinion polls, policy-makers should govern responsibly 
according to their own judgements.  This position was one advocated by Lindsay Rogers,9 Gallup’s 
chief adversary during the early years of polling in the USA.  His chief concern was over the 
limitations of mass publics as both facilitators of the political process and as designators of policy in 
representative democracies.  In arguing his case, he maintained that politicians and other political 
representatives should avoid mistaking the short-range view of the mood of voters, for the long-term 
conception of a ‘public interest’ which is not readily discernible through opinion polls.  According to 
Rogers, measuring the ‘public interest’ involves taking into consideration the opinions, values and 
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interests of the entire Commonwealth, referred to by Lippmann as “...the People, as a community of 
the entire living population, with their predecessors and successors”.10  Voters however, have a 
narrower social and historical base than the commonwealth, and cannot therefore claim to represent 
it.  What is more, voters’ inclinations are towards self-preservation in promoting their own interests, 
and they demonstrate a tendency towards hasty and ill-considered actions which may lead to unwise 
or unjust government policies.   
 From this perspective, these problems are compounded by the lack of competence of public 
opinion in political matters.  Roll and Cantril11 claim that the public as voters lack the capacity to 
effectively direct the actions of political representatives, because they do not possess the technical, 
scientific or general awareness of all the facts concerning public policy, neither are they in a position 
to conceptualize the implications of adopting particular policy positions.  Therefore, the “...public 
obviously cannot be expected to be informed and up-to-date in its understanding of complex issues, 
the implications of alternative courses of action, nor the advantages of specific instrumentalities by 
which a policy is affected”.12  Essentially this argument maintains that in most circumstances, public 
opinion is passive, and depends for its articulation upon a reaction to problems and policies presented 
to it by policy-makers and opinion leaders.  Consequently, the results of opinion polls do not 
necessarily demonstrate the views, aspirations, interests and policy-demands of the electorate; instead, 
they reflect the outcome of the struggle of competing ideologies and influential groups, organizations 
and classes in society who have influence over the pollsters in terms of the subject and the form of 
the questions asked.  Policy-makers should therefore avoid legislating on the basis of polling data 
alone. 
 
Post-communist Governments and Polls 
As is the case in liberal-capitalist societies, governments in post-communist countries find great value 
in utilizing opinion polling data (particularly for policy development) and in fact are the major 
sponsors of such research there.  For example, in Hungary, polls have in the past been used regularly 
to ask the public how they rate the various government and state institutions, and to ascertain the level 
of confidence that people have in these.  In addition, governments are interested in identifying 
citizen’s satisfaction with the new political system, and what steps they would like decision-makers 
to take in order to improve the current political arrangements.13  Polls are also used to help define the 
shape and direction of individual policies.  According to Somogyi (an opinion pollster), the 
government polled the public on the issue of land reform in 1991 in order to gauge the level of support 
for the proposed legislation, and the form that it should take (either as shares, or in terms of returning 
the actual land to its previous owner-families).14   
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 Polls have been used extensively in this way by governments in Romania, Bulgaria, (the 
former) Czechoslovakia and Poland.  Opinion pollster Datculescu claims that polls perform a 
significant range of functions for governments in post-communist Romania.  Here, they are often 
utilized as a means of auditing public opinion, and particularly the main concerns of, and problems 
confronting, the public.  Thus, his own company, IRSOP, was commissioned by Prime Minister 
Roman in 1990 to identify the extent to which the government’s plans for economic and market 
reform had the support of the public, and indeed, the final programme drew heavily on the results of 
these polls.  Furthermore, polls were sponsored by the government in 1995 as part of the general 
debate concerning the type of electoral system (majoritarian- or proportional-based) that should be 
devised for the next election.  Datculescu also notes that governments place significant emphasis on 
opinion polls in the more general area of policy-development, including for instance: the technical 
aspects of privatization policies; the development of social policies to soften the effects of national 
transition programmes on the elderly; and rural/urban migration policies.  One early example of the 
intervention of polling within the general processes of government in Romania, is cited by Datculescu 
as following a series of  demonstrations in January 1990, outside the headquarters of Petre Roman’s 
provisional government.  The main demands of the demonstrators were for the Communist Party to 
be banned, and for its leading members under Ceausescu to be executed.  The government, which had 
recently outlawed the death penalty, were unsure as to how representative of public opinion the 
demonstrators and their demands actually were.  IRSOP conducted an opinion poll which concluded 
that in fact the demonstrators’ demands were regarded by the general public as anathema to 
democracy, and more in line with the methods of the former Ceausescu regime.  By the time the data 
was available however, the issue had lost much of its salience, and the demonstration largely 
dissipated.  Nonetheless, following discussions with Prime Minister Roman, Datculescu claims that 
the polls performed a significant role in confirming within government circles, that they had the 
support of public opinion behind them in their refusal to cede to the demonstrators’ demands.15 
 A series of polls were conducted by the Bulgarian Socialist Party government during the water 
crisis of 1995.  Polls had suggested that the situation was considered as particularly acute by the 
public, but the government were faced with a dilemma in resolving the water shortages:  a solution 
seemed to lie with the development of a new water pipeline, but these plans were thought likely to 
entail negative ecological consequences for particularly the mountain region adjacent to Sofia;  
furthermore, a similar programme begun in 1990 had been met with citizens’ demonstrations and 
riots organized by Ecoglasnost, and the government were concerned not to precipitate copy-cat 
actions.  Polls however, suggested that mass opinion prioritized the solution of the water crisis over 
environmental concerns.  The issue for the government at this stage remains as how best to action the 
public’s demands without compromising both their environmental agenda, and the ecological system 
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itself.  In this, polls may perform a problem-identification role, by informing the government of mass 
sentiment on the matter, but the issue of problem-solution is too complex a process for polls by 
themselves to solve.16 
 In (former) Czechoslovakia, Herzmann17 reports that his institution’s polls (UVVM) were 
commissioned by the Presidential Office for a variety of reasons between 1990 and 1991.  In the first 
place, polls enabled the president’s advisory team to maintain close contact with the public, and to 
develop legislation from a position which was informed by public opinion.  Thus, in the early months 
after the Velvet Revolution, polls were conducted with the specific objective of developing 
democratic mechanisms (such as the electoral system) on the basis of consulting with the public via 
the polls.  Secondly, polls were frequently used in parliamentary debate to legitimize policy positions, 
set the political agenda, or else to de-sensitize issues. Hartl, of polling agency STEM, claims that the 
Czech Parliament commissioned a series of opinion polls on the Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak 
national questions prior to a vote on the issue in February 1991 which influenced the outcome of the 
debate: 
 We prepared the results of the surveys before Parliament’s plenary session on these topics.  We 
prepared a report for all MP’s two weeks before.  Debate until that time was every emotional.  Survey 
results de-sensitized the debate, and showed that the population were relaxed and calm about these 
issues.  The topic then became pushed aside from the political agenda because of our survey.  It showed 
nationalism was not really backed by the population.18 
 Polls are sometimes used in an equivalent way in Poland.  In early 1991, proposals were raised 
in Parliament which were designed to outlaw abortion.  In the interim period before the issue was 
brought to a vote, the government decided to hold a series of consultations with the public, in order 
to gauge the mood on the issue.  However, according to opinion pollster Kwiatkowski (CBOS), the 
process was ‘...not a real consultation because a lot of priests imposed letters against abortion upon 
their parishes, and a lot of pressure was put upon congregations’.19  The results of an opinion poll 
however published on the day of the parliamentary vote, contradicted the findings of these 
‘consultations’, and suggested that the majority of the public did not agree with the anti-abortion 
lobby.  As a result, the Polish Parliament voted not to allow a change in the law at that time.  However, 
opinion pollster Nowotny (Demoskop) points out the problems of using polls in this way: ‘On the 
question of the law against abortion, the danger is that the poll results are taken as an absolute, and 
the poll will be taken as a ‘surrogate’ for a referendum, and as an argument in the political dispute’.20  
Some pollsters then are clearly wary that politicians in the new post-communist societies often place 
too heavy a reliance on opinion polls, using them as a tool for developing and implementing policy 
rather than as a feedback mechanism to monitor the electorates’ views. 
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 This discussion has demonstrated the ways in which polls both feed directly into the process 
of defining democratic structures and institutions in post-communist societies, and also help to ensure 
that political elites are kept in touch with people’s views, needs and aspirations.  It also suggests that 
polls may be utilized in governmental and parliamentary debate to influence the course of policy-
making and legislation.   
 
Polls and the Political Parties 
Political parties are also important users of the polls.  However, the nature of the party system is such, 
that it largely impedes the development of strong and sustained party-pollster links of the kind that 
are noticeable in countries like Britain.  In Poland for instance, the proliferation of parties results in a 
situation where demand for the polls as a source of political intelligence to help market the parties 
cannot be satisfied because ‘...there are thousands of parties, and they are usually too poor to buy 
polls’.21  The same is the case in Romania, Bulgaria and in Hungary, where there are few parties with 
sufficient financial resources to commission polls.  This is a major fetter on the development of the 
industry, although the larger parties do frequently sponsor such opinion research, especially on poll 
omnibuses.22  Furthermore, the parties often make substantial use of secondary polling data.  Hoscalet 
notes that the election campaign team for the Civic Forum in (former) Czechoslovakia conducted a 
detailed analysis of the polling results generated by his company, AISA, in order to develop a 
campaign strategy for the general election in June 1990.23  Moser, president of the Agrarian Union, 
states that in Bulgaria it is common practice for smaller parties like her own, to rely on secondary 
polling data because of the prohibitive costs of commissioning their own primary data.  Ironically, 
she claims that at the December 1994 general election, her party, along with many others, utilized 
polling data reported in a campaign document produced by rivals, the Bulgarian Socialist Party.24 
 The uses to which polls are put by the parties in these post-communist societies, largely reflect 
those for parties found in liberal capitalist societies.25  These include monitoring the dynamics of 
electoral opinion, targeting specific voter groups, and helping to build electoral strategies.  Kivu 
recalls that from the time of Ceausescu’s fall to the middle of 1992, almost all of his company IMAS’ 
work in Romania focused on political issues, and much of it for political parties (although since that 
time, the balance has been more toward market research).  This political polling research involves 
measuring general voting intentions, reactions of the public to specific political events, the authority 
of individual party spokespersons, together with the values and demographics of different voter 
groups to try to identify electoral constituencies for party clients.  Furthermore, prior to the general 
election in Romania in 1992, polls were commissioned to ascertain the issue priorities of the electorate 
and of targeted groups, with the intention of modifying and shaping the image of these parties.26  Polls 
are used in similar ways in Bulgaria.  Gjuzelev maintains that polls have been utilized by his 
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Democratic Party to assist the establishment of an identity amongst the electorate.  Regarding itself 
as a naturally right-wing party, it found itself largely devoid of any social base within the electorate 
because of the relatively small size of the Bulgarian middle class (only about 3% of the population), 
and the virtual absence of any large, private industrial enterprises.  Consequently, polls were 
undertaken in an attempt to solve this identity crisis, and revealed that it would be electorally 
beneficial to target small land-holders and those voters whose descendants had lost their land, industry 
and dwellings during the communist period.27 
 Another major area of polling research undertaken by the parties is geared toward developing 
electoral strategies.  For instance, prior to the 1992 Romanian general election, the polling agency 
CIS were asked by the Democratic Convention to gauge the distribution of votes between its member 
parties.  The data was to be used in preparatory dialogue to organize the number of places that each 
party should have on the coalition’s electoral list, as well as their rankings on the list.  CIS negotiated 
only with the dominant Peasant Party, who largely ignored the data because the results did not reflect 
their interests.  Consequently, the final list was significantly more favourable to the Peasant Party than 
their position within the poll actually warranted, and led to intense argument between the party and 
its coalition partners.28  These developments helped to inform the Liberals within the Democratic 
Convention in 1993 that they should consider possibly leaving the coalition.  Polls conducted by 
IMAS played a significant role in this reasoning, and ultimately in the fragmentation of the National 
Liberal Party.29 The majority within the leadership of the Liberals decided to leave the Democratic 
Convention after studying IMAS’ polling data which suggested it would be politically expedient to 
do so, although one wing of the party opted to remain within the coalition.  The National Liberal Party 
then split, with one of the groupings deciding to re-join the Convention coalition.  Meanwhile, the 
group which had originally stayed in the Convention then decided to leave and form its own 
independent Liberal Party.  Later, in January 1995, the Liberal PL93 commissioned IMAS to assess 
the impact of their possibly leaving the then four-party  Liberal Coalition platform within the 
Democratic Convention, and standing instead as an independent party.  Polls suggested that this 
strategy would gain the party a 20% share of the vote, and consequently, PL93 left the Democratic 
Convention later that year. 
 In Bulgaria, secondary polling data has been utilized by the Popular Union (an alliance of the 
Democratic Party and the Agrarian Union) to aid the focusing of their general campaigning strategy 
after results showed that the public had little awareness of who it was, which parties comprised it, and 
what it stood for.  Furthermore, polling data suggested that crime was of crucial concern to voters, 
and consequently, in the final 48 hours of the 1992 general election, this issue became the primary 
campaign theme for the Popular Union.30  This coalition also organized a special strategy conference 
for the municipal and mayoral elections in April 1995, which had a specific focus on the electoral 
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importance of opinion polling, and how to use its results in campaigning.  A number of West 
European and North American electoral consultants and opinion pollsters addressed the conference, 
including the ‘Westminster Foundation’ (a right-wing organization), political advisors to the German 
CDU, and others.31 
 For the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), polls played a significant role in guiding their 
perception of, and orientation to, the government of technocrats which replaced the UDF 
administration in December 1992.  Initially the BSP had given qualified support to the government, 
but National Committee member, Miroslav Popov claims that their position changed dramatically 
following a series of opinion polls which suggested that the public were in favour of a strong, single-
party-based government.  Consequently, the BSP decided to withdraw their support in parliament for 
the government, which facilitated the elections in December 1994.  As Popov concludes, in this 
process, ‘...polls assist [the] formulation of political strategy as an important tool’.32  During the 1994 
general election campaign, the BSP made substantial use of their long-standing relationship with the 
polling company British-Balkan Social Surveys (BBSS), and commissioned a series of large-scale 
polling studies, the results of which were compiled into a campaigning document and sent out to 
activists three weeks before the election.  The report identified 100 key geographic areas for focused 
campaigning, as well as which target groups should be singled out for special consideration (such as 
highly educated workers, and women working at home), and how best to win their support (through 
for instance which themes and policies to prioritize, and how to present them).  As Popov explains, 
the campaign was not dictated by the polls, but the data performed a significant role in its development 
and focus. 
 However, whilst polls provide obvious benefits to the political parties in their general 
campaigning strategies and political marketing, their usage for these purposes is often a source of 
significant controversy, usually because it is typically only the larger parties who have the resources 
to commission them.  Consequently, smaller parties often attempt to discredit political opinion polls 
on the grounds that they facilitate unfair electoral competition, and help contribute to the continued 
dominance of the larger parties.  In countries where the electoral system sets a minimum percentage 
threshold of voter support before a party can gain representation in parliament, this is a particularly 
contentious area for polling.  Thus, Gjuzelev, claims that theoretically, in countries like Bulgaria 
where such electoral rules apply, polls could perform a useful function for smaller parties: where there 
are for instance 120 parties vying for parliamentary representation at an election (Bulgaria 1994), 
polls can help create a bandwagon for a party if the data demonstrates that it has more support than 
the minimum electoral threshold (4% in this case), by suggesting to voters that their support for that 
party would not result in a ‘wasted vote’.  Whilst opinion polls reported publicly in the media might 
assist some smaller parties in this way, their lack of resources implies that they are unable to 
 10 
 
 
 
 
commission their own polls in an attempt to generate such bandwagons.  Meanwhile, Gjuzelev claims 
that the larger Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) is able to sponsor and then manipulate their own 
polls for electoral gain as they attempted at the general election in 1994;  the UDF claimed on a 
number of occasions that their polls indicated that the Peoples Union (PU) and other small, anti-BSP 
parties would achieve less votes than that required to cross the 4% electoral threshold, and that voters 
should therefore support the UDF if they wanted to help defeat the BSP.  In the event (and contrary 
to the claims of the UDF) three such parties and coalitions (including the PU) gained sufficient votes 
to enter the parliament independently of both the dominant UDF and BSP parties.33   In a similar 
example, Anastassia Moser, president of the Agrarian Union, suggests that there is widespread 
evidence of collusion between the former communist BSP, and the polling agency BBSS in trying to 
disorientate their rivals.  This party-pollster alliance has a historical basis to it, in that the BBSS is the 
reorganized, former state-polling institute National Public Opinion Centre, which operated under the 
command of the communist regime during Ceausescu’s era.  Consequently, there are significant and 
long-standing links between the leading personnel in both organizations.   Moser claims that BBSS 
was engaged in a propaganda-based campaign to create uncertainty and divisions within the Popular 
Union (of which her Party was a member) by releasing a series of poll results in the run-up to the 
1994 Bulgarian general election which indicated that in coalition with the Democratic Party, they 
would achieve only 3% of the vote, but on their own, the Agrarian Union would pass the 4% electoral 
threshold, with 5%.  These results from BBSS contradicted other opinion poll findings.  In the event, 
her party stayed with the coalition, which ultimately gained 6.5% of the votes, and 18 seats in 
parliament.34   
 Allied to these problems is the criticism and scepticism that both political parties and the 
public have of any close associations that pollsters may have with the political parties.  According to 
Somogyi, this is a hang-over from the communist era, where polling institutes were usually seen as 
an information-gathering appendage of the state, and as such a propaganda instrument of the Marxist-
Leninist parties: 
 Pollsters which are associated with a particular party are distrusted.  For instance, the Meridian polling 
organization are accused of being in contact with the biggest opposition party, the Free Democrats.  So 
people don’t believe their results.  And (the) state-owned organization is still accused of being 
associated with the old Communist Party.  This company is the Hungarian Institute for Public Opinion.  
Their leaders were members of the Party.  And if they had resigned, it was only to change direction 
with the way the wind blows.  So they are still perceived as Party members.35 
In (former) Czechoslovakia, the polling company Demoskopy was criticized for similar reasons.  Its 
founder was both a former director of the state-owned polling institute UVVM, as well as a candidate 
for the Socialist Party at the June 1990 elections.  The share of public support reported for the Socialist 
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Party was consistently higher in Demoskopy’s polls than in any other institute’s polls.  Opinion 
pollster Herzmann claims that this is due to the biased nature of Demoskopy’s field-interview force, 
which was recruited through the Socialist Party’s newspaper. 
 Similar problems arise in Romania, where ‘...the election returns [in 1992] baffled the 
expectations of most analysts and contradicted the forecasts of all but one Romanian pollster’.36  Only 
IRSOP correctly predicted victory for both Iliescu and for his National Democratic Salvation Front - 
all the other pollsters’ forecasts were that Constantinescu and the Democratic Convention would be 
the likely winners.37  However, Sandu notes that even IRSOP’s record was inconsistent: of the two 
polls they conducted, only the second correctly identified the eventual presidential and parliamentary 
victors, yet the poll results were significantly different statistically from the final voting results.38   
Furthermore, throughout the campaign period, there was significant variation recorded in the results 
of individual pollsters, as well as across polling agencies.39  Sandu claims that one source of blame 
for these polling failures lies in the nature of the interview teams employed.40  IRSOP, for instance 
recruited its fieldworkers from the Research Institute for Youth Problems, which had been established 
by, and was accountable to, the Central Committee of the communist youth organization under 
Ceausescu’s reign.  Sandu, vice-president of the Romanian Sociological Association, claims that it 
was therefore generally acknowledged to be left-wing (hence the strong showing for the NSDF in its 
polls).  However, IMAS’ interviewers were recruited through the right-wing weekly ‘22’, the journal 
of the Group for Social Dialogue, which was active within the Democratic Convention.  Both polling 
agencies have replaced their fieldwork teams since the 1992 general elections, following criticism 
from both the general sociological community in Romania and from the media there.41 
  One of the most critically received party-pollster associations reported during the various 
research visits conducted for this study is that between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and the 
polling agency British-Balkan Social Surveys (BBSS).42  However, it is not entirely clear whether or 
not there is any direct collusion between the two in terms of massaging and manipulating poll results 
to create a bandwagon for the BSP in elections.  Certainly, at the 1991 general election, BBSS were 
the only polling agency to predict (incorrectly) a victory for the former communists, and in 1994, 
their forecast of the final BSP margin of victory was both higher than other pollsters’ pre-election 
polls, and than that actually achieved by the Party.43 Furthermore, there is intensive criticism of this 
relationship by both opposition parties and by anti-socialist newspapers.  Gjuzelev, for instance claims 
there is a triangular network of deception on behalf of the BSP, which includes the party, pollsters, 
and some media organizations: the largest circulation daily newspaper, ‘24 Hours’ is a supporter of 
the BSP and arch-critic of the UDF, reporting only polls conducted by BBSS;  and a subsidiary of 
BBSS, Mediana (again with a largely pro-BSP executive) has an exclusive polling contract with the 
state television company (which has a virtual monopoly over this media form).44  As a consequence, 
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many opposition parties, commentators, and political activists allege that the BSP, BBSS, Mediana, 
and a number of media organizations have between them a virtual monopoly of the processes of 
polling information diffusion within Bulgaria, and significant scope therefore to manipulate the public 
through ‘fake’ or massaged polls.45  The criticism which the party, pollsters and media receive, 
whether warranted or not, has the effect of undermining the credibility of polls generally, as far as the 
public is concerned.  In Romania, IRSOP have in the past been condemned on similar grounds for the 
polling research they have conducted for the ruling NSF in 1990 and 1991, and later, for the NDSF-
dominated government and Iliescu’s presidential team. 
 The electorates’ scepticism of party-polling is further undermined by the proliferation of 
(largely unknown) ad hoc ‘ghost’ pollsters during election campaign periods.  This is a significant 
problem in Romania, where more established pollsters often claim that these ‘ghost’ agencies (which 
are usually linked to various political parties) have as their sole purpose to manipulate electoral 
outcomes and the general political process.  Furthermore, they often place little store in the need for 
adopting rigorous scientific methods.  According to Abraham, it is typical for such agencies to cite 
the failure of pollsters to predict electoral outcomes in countries like Britain (1992), Italy (1995), and 
France (1995) where polling is more established, as ultimately confirming the inherent limitations of 
polls, and as justification for themselves in producing findings which do not correspond with more 
mainstream polls.46  Thus, Kivu reports that in the 1992 Romanian general election period, there were 
about ten such fake polls produced by ‘ghost’ polling institutes, all utilizing non-rigorous methods 
(such as sample sizes of 100 respondents).  One such poll suggested that the Greater Romania Party, 
scoring about 4% in most polls (and achieving 3.9% in the election), had the support of 30% of the 
voters.47  A further example of the publics’ scepticism of opinion polling can be found with reference 
to a Bulgarian electoral law which prohibits the publication of polls 14 days prior to an election, as 
well as the government ban on exit polls which has remained in place since the BSP election victory 
in 1990.  In relation to the latter, the action was brought about when the opposition UDF mounted a 
campaign alleging procedural irregularities and fraud during the election, including a charge that the 
German polling institute INFAS had manipulated their findings in order to facilitate a bandwagon for 
the BSP, and falsify the elections.  Ultimately, the UDF campaign culminated in a mass demonstration 
against electoral fraud, which won the support of the President, Zhelev.  As part of the government’s 
response to this campaign, exit polls were banned.48 
 
Polls and the Mass Media in Post-communist Countries 
A further way in which the development of polling in these new societies is mirroring liberal capitalist 
political systems, is in terms of the quantity (and as we shall see, the quality) of media-polling 
activities. In Hungary, media-pollster activities are particularly vigorous: ‘Each newspaper has their 
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own poll, and nearly everyday an opinion poll is reported, [conducted] by different companies.  There 
are five companies producing polls for newspapers regularly, and about one hundred small ones’.49  
Somogyi reports that television polling and secondary reporting of polls were common activities 
during the May 1990 general election in Hungary, where ‘...polls became a popular source of 
information’.50  However, in Poland, the restructuring of the media industry in 1990 led to the collapse 
of the RSW, a huge state-owned media group previously organized under the Communist Party, and 
a potential major investor in polls.  The replacement of a state-controlled industry by a privatized 
industry guided by the free-market has led to a situation whereby a proliferation of small media 
companies, engaged in fierce competition with their rivals, and in a weak and vulnerable economic 
position, do not have the available resources to sponsor more than the occasional ad hoc public 
opinion poll.51  Nonetheless, the media-interest in, and reporting of opinion polls is substantial in 
these countries.  Where there are formal associations with the media as sponsors of the polls, the 
pollsters themselves report that they are usually able to exert control over how the polls are devised, 
conducted, analyzed and reported.  Evidence suggests that there is significant pollster autonomy from 
their media clients.  Pollsters are usually confident that they are able to ensure that acceptable 
scientific standards of reliability are met in Hungary, Poland, (former) Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania for instance: there is close collaboration and negotiation with the clients on sample size and 
question-wording, and basic technical details are usually reported (sample size, number of sampling 
points, fieldwork dates and method, and size of the sampling error).  This enables readers to judge the 
reliability of such polls. 
 One major area of concern with media-polls however, is the organizational and budgetary 
restrictions which the media impose on the pollsters.  When combined, these impede the performance 
and accuracy of the polls, and ultimately undermine their credibility amongst the public.  Nowotny 
claims for instance that it is usual practice in Poland for ‘...regular newspaper polls to be made very 
quickly - one day interviewing, and the next day the results.  This type of survey is only possible with 
quota samples, not random samples.  So the statistical parameters are not very strict’.52  A further key 
problem is the lack of polling expertise amongst journalists in many of these countries.  As a 
consequence, they often misinterpret, exaggerate or even distort the poll findings.  In Romania, as 
with other post-communist countries, journalists typically have no training in (nor inclination to find 
out about) the usage and reporting of poll findings.53 They tend to have little understanding of social 
science empirical research, nor of the need for precision reporting, including the differences in 
findings from ‘open’ and ‘closed’ questions, question bias, and statistical significance; it is not 
uncommon for journalists to make what might appear to be merely basic typographical errors, but 
which in fact have significant statistical interpretation implications (such as the reporting of an 800 
sample size poll as 8000).  Often, the press will conduct their own polls.  Muscetescu54 claims that 
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there were many such polls in Romania during 1990, and these tended to ignore basic social science 
research convention.  Problems arising from this included for instance the use of double-barreled55 
and poorly structured questions, the over-sampling of easy-to-contact groups like intellectuals, and 
the under-sampling of groups which are more difficult to contact such as peasants.  Datculescu56 
criticizes the practice of the press to use ‘coupon’ polls57 where there is no control over sample 
selection, and which are both voluntary and subject to self-selection.  These results are later reported 
in other newspapers, often as if they had been conducted by established opinion pollsters using 
methodical and rigorous scientific techniques. 
 Another major issue in the media’s usage of opinion polls is the tendency to publish only 
findings which support a particular political inclination or ideological outlook.  This is especially 
noticeable in the press.  According to Herzmann, in (former) Czechoslovakia, ‘Certain newspapers 
with a party bias or inclination, look for the data that fit their orientations’.58  This practice is common 
elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe.  Muscetescu claims for instance that in Romania, the media 
often employ poll stories in order to strengthen their partisan positions; media output of polls depends 
more on what the data actually says, than how professionally or not it has been conducted.  
Consequently, there is overt political manipulation by the media (especially the press) of opinion 
polls.59  However, there is a growing tendency of the pollsters to assert their professionalism and 
independence vis-à-vis their media clients, and they often assist in the drafting of press reports.  
Nonetheless, the most important (and influential) aspect of media poll stories - the headline - is usually 
written by the journalist, with no input from the pollster. 
 The implications of selection, interpretation, and reporting of poll stories by the media on 
ideological grounds is given by Ivanov.  He suggests that there are two important aspects of 
contemporary Bulgarian society which have the effect of making the public particularly susceptible 
to media-poll bias.  The essence of these is likely to apply to other post-communist countries.  Firstly, 
he proposes that one important legacy of communism is that of ‘paternalism’, one aspect of which 
includes the public having ‘politics’ explained to them by leaders.  In the post-1989 context, this is 
reflected in the publics’ tendency to look for opinion ‘leaders’ (politicians, the mass media, opinion 
pollsters) to help them make sense of politics.  Consequently, in countries  like Bulgaria, there is an 
absence of any completely independent opinion-making by the public - people are relatively easily 
influenced therefore by any poll they read.  The second aspect of contemporary society therefore 
which contributes to the vulnerability of the public to manipulation is the misrepresentation or 
distortion of polling data by media organizations.  This is likely to have a significant effect on public 
opinion formation, and as we have seen, is as common practice in post-communist societies as in 
liberal capitalist societies.  The mass media organizations tend to present data in specific ways in 
order to promote their ideological positions and the parties which best represent them, and to 
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encourage the salience of preferred political agendas.  In Bulgaria, virtually all the newspapers have 
at least informal links with political parties, and this is common throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe.60 The scope for media-polls to influence the public, regardless of how objective and 
professional they were or were not conducted, is therefore significant in post-communist countries. 
  Furthermore, as is often the case in countries like Britain, journalists are often poorly trained 
in polling and psephology, tending to focus on headline polling data such as voting intention levels 
whilst ignoring other results.  There is a tendency to sensationalize small changes in party support, 
without referring to or publishing the technical details (such as sampling error) which might help to 
point-up the minimalist nature of such findings, or bring to the readers’ attention the qualifications 
which pollsters attach to the raw figures.  Thus, in countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary 
and (former) Czechoslovakia where the electorates’ support is distributed amongst a multitude of 
competing parties, a one or two point change in a particular party’s poll ratings is often reported by 
the media as indicating a significant development.  It also tends to suggest to journalists and the public 
that there is major variation amongst the pollsters, demonstrating that the polls are unreliable.  Where 
this is the case, Herzmann claims that: ‘The public doubts if the polls present a ‘real’ picture of society.  
They wonder if we are lying, cheating or helping a political party’.61  This public scepticism of polls 
is reinforced by the tendency in some post-communist countries to treat poll issues as headline stories 
themselves, rather than as illustration of current affairs issues.  Thus, in a research visit to Romania 
in May 1995 as part of this study, the daily newspaper Ziua (Today) reported a study which cast doubt 
on the credibility of the polling industry there, and received significant air-time on national state-
television.  On a front-page top-headline story, Ziua reported that a North American consultancy, 
Rowlands Research Team, had produced a 124-page report on the credibility and political 
independence of four of the leading polling agencies, and concluded that there was clear evidence of 
political complicity between IRSOP and the presidency.  The headlines62 read: 
Ziua Succeeded To Find Out Some Secrets From Washington.  American Experts Demonstrated: 
Iliescu Succeeded To Manipulate Us By IRSOP For Five Years 
Datculescu’s Company [IRSOP] Has The Lowest Degree Of Credibility, And The Highest Level of 
Political Dependency Among Romanian Public Opinion Institutions. 
According to Romanian opinion pollsters, such stories are not untypical, and reflect a preoccupation 
with, and often discrediting of, pollsters by the media, especially if they have conducted work for 
political parties, movements or institutions anathema to that media organization.  For instance, both 
Sandu (1995, vice-president of the Romanian Sociological Association) and Campeanu (1995, 
Director of the polling agency CIS) claim that the editor of Ziua is a former leading member of the 
Romanian Securitate, whose paper has formal links with the anti-Iliescu right-wing UDF.  The 
newspaper article fails to consider basic questions with which to assess the validity of the study’s 
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findings, including: who Rowlands Research Team are; why they conducted the research; on whose 
behalf was the research undertaken; how the study was conducted; and what criteria were used to 
measure both credibility, and political independence. 
 As a consequence of such developments in the usage of polls by media organizations, the 
public has become increasingly sceptical of political opinion polls in many post-communist countries, 
because of the way they are used, and occasionally abused by the media and journalists. 
Conclusion 
What general conclusions can be drawn?  In post-communist countries, polls have a valuable role to 
play for governments and political elites in terms of tapping into the publics’ perceptions of the newly 
established political structures and political processes.  According to McIntosh and Abele MacIver, 
this is important because these governments seek guidance through responding to citizens’ views.63  
Opinion polls therefore have a formal role to perform as a guide to both the nature of the political 
institutions and arrangements which the public consider should be developed, and to the social and 
economic policies which they believe should be pursued.  There is also buoyant demand from political 
parties and the mass media (although the public is sceptical of close associations between the pollsters 
and such clients).  It would be difficult to conclude however that these political agencies genuinely 
seek to use polls as tools through which to devolve power to civil society.  Polls will usually be 
commissioned by various agencies in order to manipulate the public and the political process.  The 
larger political parties commission polls with the same objectives in mind as their counter-parts in 
liberal capitalist countries like Britain, that is, to test their propaganda and to package their policies in 
ways which are electorally appealing to voters.64  Often, the relationship between these parties and 
the pollsters will be perceived as one of collusion by the public, and as a hangover from the communist 
era in which the pollsters were agents of the state, conducting propaganda through which to sustain 
the hegemony of dominant elites.65  The poor quality of media-sponsored and media-reported polls 
intensifies public scepticism of polling and contributes to a contradiction in the status of polling in 
these societies: on the one hand, the use of polls in the political process by the new regimes as a means 
of consulting with the public enhances the latter’s positive views of polls, and ultimately improves 
the reliability of polls; on the other hand, the experiences of polling undertaken and/or utilized by 
parties and the mass media organizations serves to diminish both the public’s confidence of and 
participation within opinion polls, and ultimately undermines the quality of polls. 
 There is significant scope for polls to strengthen and extend the processes of democratization, 
but polls will stop short of challenging the basis of elite power in society.  Polls will inform the 
decision-making processes within different, competing elite groups, and compel these elites to 
respond to the demands of the citizenry.  In this way, polls provide a channel through which the public 
can bring some pressure to bear on those who wield political power.  Ultimately however, they do not 
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help to wrest such power from the elites.  In fact, the information which polls convey actually helps 
elites to compete for political power more effectively; in reality, polls reinforce the political hegemony 
of elites.  Similarly, media-sponsored polls both contribute to, and undermine the democratic process.  
Media organizations enjoy relative freedom from the state to channel information about political 
affairs to the public.  However, the manipulation of polling data by the mass media is such that the 
information can often be distorted, and there is significant potential for the public to be misinformed 
about political issues and events.  Consequently, the public’s capacity to make informed decisions 
about political affairs and hold elites accountable for their actions via the polls will be reduced. 
Opinion polls are therefore to be seen as double-edged weapons in the battle for democracy: they 
enable the public to channel their views to political elites, but  the sponsors of the polls (the mass 
media organizations and various political elites) have significant capacity to design the polls, 
determine which questions are asked of the public, shape the political agenda, and influence both 
which political information is available for general consumption by the public, and what form it 
should take.  Such developments suggest that the role of polls in European post-communist societies 
is one which is better understood in terms of Schumpeter’s view of competitive elitism than Gallup’s 
direct democracy model. 
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